Abstract-The fact that millimeter-wave (mmWave) communication needs to be directional is usually perceived as a challenge; in this letter, we argue that it enables efficient secret key sharing that is unconditionally secure from passive eavesdroppers by building on packet erasures. We showcase the potential of our approach in two setups: 5G networks and vehicle platooning. In both cases, with the right choice of parameters, we can potentially establish keys in the order of tenths of Mb/s. These first results are based on some simplifying assumptions, yet we believe that they give incentives to further explore such techniques.
natural host environment for erasure-based key establishment. Differently from existing physical layer secrecy works [7] , our proposed protocol: 1) is information-theoretically secure against passive eavesdroppers with limited network presence, 2) allows for very high secret key exchange rates, and 3) is autonomous (i.e., does not require third-party assistance).
Our proposed technique differs from existing cryptographic encryption measures which depend on limited adversarial capabilities: computational capabilities, e.g. DiffieHellman (DH), or storage capabilities, e.g., Bounded-Storage Model [8] . In contrast, our proposed scheme establishes secret keys that are information-theoretically secure against eavesdroppers with limited network presence. Moreover, current cryptographic techniques rely on high complexity algorithms to compensate for the low rate of secret key establishment. In this work, we show, through two different scenarios, that our scheme promises secret key generation rates in the order of tens/hundreds of Mbps.
Main Contributions: We showcase our approach for two scenarios: (1) 5G wireless networks, where base stations use mmWave antenna arrays for transmissions. First, we propose an analytical model for the instantaneous received Signal-toNoise-Ratio (SNR), that is inspired from the empirical channel model in [9] and 5G system parameters (e.g., antenna array sizes and beam patterns as described in [2] ). We show that, with the right choice of parameters, rates up to 300 Mbps are achieved. (2) Vehicular platooning, which is a safetycritical application. We show that, with appropriate choices of code parameters and antenna placement, our technique allows platoons to establish keys with rates up to 166 Mbps -4 orders of magnitude gain over rates achieved by DH; this allows the use of (otherwise impractical) One-Time Pad (OTP) encryption.
II. MODEL AND BACKGROUND

A. System and Adversary Model
We consider a pair of communicating parties (a.k.a. Alice and Bob) who wish to establish a pairwise key using the scheme in [5] , [6] . The transmitting party (Alice) is connected to a set of N T transmitting mmWave antenna arrays, labeled t i , i ∈ {1, · · · , N T }. Alice and Bob wish to communicate secretly in the presence of an eavesdropper (a.k.a. Eve). Bob and Eve are both equipped with a single antenna. We assume Eve to be located anywhere within the transmission radius of the communicating parties, and is passive; therefore its location is unknown. We assume also that Eve has access to the same physical layer technology as the legitimate nodes, has infinite memory as well as unbounded computational capabilities at her disposal, and has perfect knowledge of the protocols.
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The transmitting power used by each transmitting antenna is P T , while the noise figure at each receiving antenna array (for both Bob and Eve) is N o . The available bandwidth is B. We assume that each transmitting antenna array focuses its transmitting energy in desired directions by the use of appropriate beamforming mechanisms. Given a particular beamforming direction, the received SNR at the receiver (resp. eavesdropper) antenna from the ith transmitter antenna is denoted by γ (ti,r) (resp. γ (ti,e) ). Considering that the wireless channel is typically random, then γ (ti,r) and γ (ti,e) are random variables.
B. Proposed Analytical Channel Model
In this letter, we assume that γ (i,j) in dB is normally distributed with variance σ 2 and mean γ
av (1, θ) − α log 10 (d) with parameter α, where d and θ are the distance and the azimuth angle between ith transmitter and jth receiver (the receiver is either Bob or Eve). The term γ (i,j) av (1, θ) corresponds to the average received SNR at a receiver located 1 m away from the ith transmitter and with the same azimuth angle as the jth receiver. This value is dependent on P T , N o as well as the beampattern of the transmitting antenna array. This model agrees with the experimental model described next.
C. Experimental mmWave Channel Model
(1) For 5G cellular networks, we implement the point-topoint 73 GHz outdoor channel model proposed in [9] which takes into account line-of-sight as well as multipath fading signal components. Moreover, in order to take into account the fact that transmitters/receivers that are close by in space exhibit similar channel characteristic, we implement space consistency between receivers and transmitters, as specified in [10] . We also use the standard antenna radiation pattern in [10] . We empirically validate that the experimental model matches the analytical one with σ 2 = 24, α = 21 and, for θ ∈ [−180, 180],
where γ (i,j) init = 10 log 10 (P T /BN o ) and the term −66.8 dB accounts for the path loss due to 1-m of signal propagation. Our validation is based on Monte-Carlo simulations with 300000 iterations using the aforementioned channel model. (2) For vehicular networks, similar mmWave channel models are lacking. Instead, we developed a three-ray groundreflection model: an extension to the two-ray ground-reflection model which accounts for line-of-sight as well as reflections from the trunk of the front car and the hood of the back car. We also used a realistic model for a vertically-polarized 70 GHz antenna array system.
D. Secret Key Protocol [11]
The protocol proposed in [11] allows Alice and Bob (each with possibly multiple antennas) to establish a shared key which is secret from Eve. We here briefly explain how the protocol works, and delegate the details of the protocol to [5] , [11] . The protocol operates in two rounds of transmission.
Round 1: Alice sends a set of random packets to Bob, who sends feedback of which packets were correctly received. The key idea is that some of these packets are received by Bob while being erased for Eve. If Alice knows a lower-bound estimate N of such erased packets, then it can create a shared secret key of size N with Bob in the second round.
Round 2: Assume that x 1 , · · · , x M are the M packets now shared between Alice and Bob, and Eve knows M − N of them. Then, the secure common key is the concatenation of y 1 , · · · , y N , where the packets y i are carefully designed (based on MDS codes [6] ) linear combinations of x 1 , · · · , x M . Note that Alice does not need to know which N packets are erased; only the number of such packets suffices.
Example: In round 1, Alice sends x 1 to x 4 to Bob, who sends a feedback that packets x 1 to x 3 were correctly received. Assuming Eve missed two packets N = 2, then in round 2, the secret key is the concatenation of y 1 = x 1 + x 2 and y 2 = x 2 + x 3 which Eve would know nothing about.
Note that this secret is created by knowing that Eve misses at least two packets, but not necessarily knowing which two exactly. The security is guaranteed by the fact that the second round does not involve sending the secret itself but rather the packet indices used to create the secrets [6] (e.g., the indices (1, 2) and (2, 3) in the discussed example). In our setting, we make worst-case estimates on how much Eve misses i.e., N , and assess how good these estimates are via the insecure areas concept as we show next.
E. Creating Erasures and Insecure Areas
As discussed previously, the cornerstone of the protocol is the validity of the estimate of N : how much information was erased by Eve. In this work, we try to enforce erasures using wiretap codes and directionality. A high-level description of wiretap codes is as follows. The performance of a wiretap code is dictated by two parameters, namely Th 1 and Th 2 . Three distinct situations can occur when a wiretap-coded packet is received: 1) if it is received with γ ≥ Th 1 then it is decoded perfectly (i.e., "received"), 2) if γ ≤ Th 2 then it is completely missed by the receiver (i.e., "erased"), and 3) if Th 1 > γ > Th 2 then partial information can be extracted from the packet. We assume that packets transmitted in the first round are encoded using wiretap codes. Therefore, using the introduced vernacular, Alice hopes that Bob "receives" these packets while at least some of the packets are "erased" at Eve. In our setup, we always make the assumption that N = 1, i.e., packets from at least one transmission/receiver link are erased at Eve while received by Bob; we refer to this event as the Secret Reception (SecRec) event. According to that definition, we can formally define the event as
Increasing the number of transmitters/receivers (and dispersing them geographically) increase the probability of this estimate of N . Note that the protocol fails (Bob fails to receive or Eve breaks the system) when the Secret Reception event does not happen. We therefore consider the protocol to be vulnerable if P SecRec is not high enough, i.e., P SecRec ≤ 1 − δ where δ is our security level. We refer to this situation as the protocol being not δ-secure. The region in space where this occurs (i.e., the probability is not high enough) is referred to as the Insecure Area (IA). Other mechanisms may be needed to protect against eavesdroppers in the IA, and therefore a smaller IA indicates a stronger key agreement mechanism.
F. Performance Metrics
1) The Average Secret Key Rate: Given a wiretap code with parameters Th 1 and Th 2 , and when a SecRec event happens, a key generation rate
can be established between communicating parties while being secure from Eve. The Transmission Rate corresponds to the raw transmission rate from the ith transmitting antenna. The Secrecy Overhead accounts for the coding overhead due to wiretap codes, thus the difference is the achieved throughput. Finally, the average secret key rate is
where is the expectation operator and ½ {x} is the indicator function that event x occurred.
2) δ-Insecure Area or IA δ : We define the set A = {r, θ : P SecRec ≤ 1 − δ} as the set of locations in space where the protocol is not δ-secure, where r, θ are polar coordinates. Therefore, we can define the δ-Insecure Area as
δ-Insecure Area captures the regions where the likelihood of Eve breaking the secret key establishment mechanism is too high (i.e., at least δ).
III. SHOWCASE I -5G NETWORKS
A. System Parameters
We assume a 5G cellular network with N T base stations (which act as Alice's transmitters). A mobile device is located at position (0, 0) and an eavesdropper's location is unknown. We assume that base stations are symmetrically distributed around the mobile device at a circle of radius d. Each base station is equipped with mmWave planar antenna arrays with 6 × 6 elements, which beamforms at the location of the mobile device, while the mobile device and the eavesdropper receive in an omni-directional manner. We assume the channel bandwidth is B = 1 GHz and P T /BN o = −99.
B. Secret Key Establishment Protocols
We Incorporate the secret key exchange scheme into the assumed 5G network. The thresholds are computed based on the assumed transmission rate and the target secret key rate as follows. We set the Transmission rate to the raw transmission rate R T which gives the corresponding value of Th 1 . To achieve a target secret key exchange rate R S , the Secrecy Overhead rate is set to R T − R S , which gives the value of Th 2 .
C. Dedicated Packets (High Secrecy Rate)
In this protocol, dedicated frames are sent for the purpose of secret key establishment. The thresholds are freely determined so as to establish a good secret key rate and a small insecure area. We select Th 1 = 7 dB. Figure 1 shows the insecure area versus different choices of Th 2 for d = 2, N T = 4. The figure suggests that the insecure region can be significantly decreased by increasing the value of Th 2 to 3 dB. In fact, setting Th 2 = 3 dB yields R max = 301 Mbps. Figure 2 shows how much R av is achieved against eavesdroppers in different locations. It is clear that in most of the region, the maximum secret key generation rate is achieved.
IV. SHOWCASE II -VEHICLE PLATOONING
Vehicle platooning comprises a set of autonomous cars which drive on the road in a line formation with approximately the same speed and relatively small inter-vehicle distances [3] .
A. Setup and Protocol
We assume that each car has two mmWave antenna arrays used for transmission and two omni-directional antennas for reception. One pair of transmit/receive antennas (pair-1) is mounted on top of the roof of the car at a height of 0.5 m and the other pair (pair-2) at 1 m. We assume that P T /BN o = 110.
The secret key protocol works as follows: 1) Pair-1 from the front car sends random packets encoded with a suitable wiretap code to Pair-1 of the back car (Link-1), 2) Pair-2 from the front car sends random packets encoded with a suitable wiretap code to Pair-2 of the back car (Link-2), 3) the front car sends a set of carefully-designed packets as per the protocol in [11] to the back car to establish secret keys.
B. Analysis and Discussion
The preliminary channel model we developed does not account for random channel fading. Therefore, the concept of δ-insecure area becomes a deterministic one, i.e., we only consider IA 0 . Our key agreement protocol can establish up to 166 Mbps of secret bits, with IA 0 = 0. To put this number in perspective, a typical symmetric key exchange algorithm such as (DH-2048), implemented on an off-the-shelf DedicatedShort-Range-Communication (DSCR) transceiver, gives a key generation rate of approximately 20 kbps; that is, there is a performance gain of approximately 4 orders of magnitude.
C. Application Example
We will show next that, thanks to the high rate of secret key generation, our protocol allows for the use of OTP to secure the string stability functionality of vehicle platoons. In order to maintain string stability within the platoon controllers, each car in the platoon exchanges data packets every 100 ms, each of size 60 bytes [3] , with both the cars in front of and to the back of it. We will show that our suggested key agreement technique can generate enough secret bits which allows the use of OTP to encrypt such messages. Assume that our proposed algorithm for key generation is used every 5 minutes for a duration of 10 ms. Therefore, each two consecutive cars will have an amount of secret keys equal to 10 ms×166 Mbps ≈ 200 kB to use for encryption during the next 5 minutes. The total amount of data to be transmitted during the next 5 minutes is equal to 5 min × 60 B ≈ 180 kB ≤ 200 kB of secret bits. Therefore, OTP is a practical solution, something rarely achieved in any other kind of security application.
D. Discussion
Comparing our proposed key establishment mechanism that is based on channel erasures, against conventional DH algorithms, we note that our solution is superior in the following aspects: 1) it attains 4 orders of magnitude gains in terms of key generation rates, 2) it allows for using encryption techniques with very low complexity (e.g., OTP) and 3) it is not vulnerable against eavesdroppers with high computational powers (e.g., quantum adversaries). However, it is affected by the availability of a wide transmission bandwidth and the network-presence of adversaries.
V. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSIONS
In this letter we investigated how the directional nature of mmWave communication can be used to enhance security.
We showcased how mmWaves and wiretap codes can enhance the performance of secret key generation techniques in the context of two applications, 5G cellular networks and vehicle platooning. For both cases, we used/developed channel models with realistic antenna parameters to give realistic assessment of such protocols. For the case of 5G networks, we empirically developed analytical expressions for the received SNR. We showed that dedicated protocols in 5G networks and vehicle platooning establish very high rates. This work is an initial investigation on the topic. We believe that our results are enticing enough to build a complete system-level implementations of our proposed scheme and analyze its performance in real-world.
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